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a trade advantage on China (see figure 1).
The real exchange rate has, however,
undergone some large swings over the
past decade. Between June 1995 and
October 1997, the dollar depreciated 
11.4 percent against the renminbi on a
real basis because China’s inflation 
rate exceeded the U.S. inflation rate (see
figure 2). Between October 1997 and
October 2003, however, China’s inflation
rate dipped below the U.S. inflation rate,
causing the dollar to appreciate 17.2 per-
cent on a real basis against the renminbi.
Since October 2003, China’s inflation
rate has generally exceeded ours, and the
dollar has again depreciated 1.1 percent
against the renminbi in real terms. The
recent revaluation moves the real ren-
minbi–dollar exchange rate approxi-
mately back to its mid-1995 level. 
Critics might complain that our calcula-
tions are flawed because we do not 
correct for China having set the initial
renminbi–dollar exchange rate at an
artificially favorable level. Many con-
tend that the initial peg undervalued 
August 15, 2005
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
The Chinese Renminbi: 
What’s Real, What’s Not
by Patrick Higgins and Owen F. Humpage
ISSN 0428-1276
China's recent devaluation and 
liberalization of its exchange-rate
policies will, at best, have only a tem-
porary impact on its trade competi-
tiveness with the United States. The
type of exchange-rate regime that a
country adopts matters little for its
long-term international competitive-
ness. In addition, the recent focus on
China's exchange rate diverts atten-
tion from the real problem: China’s
command economy.
On July 21, China devalued its 
currency—the renminbi—2.1 percent to
8.11 per dollar and revised its proce-
dures for exchange-rate management.
The new operating method—supposedly
similar to Singapore’s—provides China
with a more flexible, but less transpar-
ent, mechanism for its exchange-market
interventions. Since the revaluation,
however, the renminbi has not changed
much, suggesting that this move might
not immediately herald a series of 
renminbi appreciations. 
Many claim that China scores an unfair
trade advantage against the United States
because it keeps the renminbi at an artifi-
cially attractive rate relative to the dollar.
If China revalued its currency or allowed
it to float freely in the foreign-exchange
market, so the argument goes, its compet-
itive edge would dull, and our trade
deficit with China—$180 billion in the
twelve months ending May 2005, a full
26 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit in
goods—would shrink. 
To be sure, China is not a free-market
economy; it maintains a network of
trade restraints, financial controls, cor-
porate subsidies, state-run enterprises,
and state-directed investments that
enhance its ability to compete in global
markets. These practices are problematic
and the legitimate targets of criticism by
anyone whom they harm. But com-
plaints about the peg giving China a
huge trade advantage against the United
States seem overstated. 
This Economic Commentary argues that
revaluing the renminbi or introducing
more exchange-rate flexibility will, at
best, affect China’s trade competitive-
ness only temporarily and will, in the
process, divert focus from the real prob-
lem: China’s command economy. To
keep the renminbi at its current level,
China creates an artificial demand for
renminbi through substantial restraints
on financial outflows and, to a lesser
degree, on imports. As these restraints
weaken while trade continues to expand,
China will find the nominal peg increas-
ingly difficult to maintain. To understand
why these restraints matter more than
the peg, we must first distinguish
between the nominal and the real ren-
minbi exchange rate. 
■ What’s Real?
Between mid-1995 and the recent deval-
uation, China maintained the exchange
value of the renminbi at approximately
8.3 per dollar. This pegged value and the
recent 8.1 renminbi–dollar exchange rate
tell us nothing about China’s competi-
tiveness relative to the United States
because they ignore price patterns in the
two countries. If the renminbi cost of
goods in China were rising faster than
the dollar price of the same goods in the
United States, any initial trade gain asso-
ciated with a fixed exchange rate would
soon erode away. The real renminbi-
dollar exchange rate adjusts the peg
value for U.S. and Chinese inflation dif-
ferentials, thereby providing a clearer
picture of China’s competitive position.
All else constant, a real appreciation of
the dollar relative to the renminbi places
the United States at a competitive disad-
vantage vis–à–vis China, while a real
depreciation has the opposite effect. 
On a real basis, the dollar appreciated
only 2.6 percent against the renminbi
between June 1995 and May 2005; such
a small movement cannot confer much ofthe renminbi, and if China had origi-
nally pegged its currency to the dollar
at a lower, more reasonable value, say, 
7.3 to 1 instead of 8.3 to 1—that is, had
substantially revalued the renminbi—
our simple calculations might show an
entirely different outcome, one more
consistent with their allegations. 
To claim that China undervalued its peg
and continues to do so, analysts must
somehow divine the long-run “equilib-
rium” value of the renminbi–dollar
exchange rate. This often involves a
number of rather arbitrary judgments
and assumptions about the underlying
economic model. Typically, the calcula-
tions involve comparing relative infla-
tion patterns in China and the United
States, possibly with some allowance
for productivity trends in both coun-
tries, and estimating a “sustainable”
configuration for Chinese balance-of-
payments relationships. 
Determining an equilibrium exchange
rate for a developed, market-based,
financially mature country is challeng-
ing, but doing so for a developing coun-
try like China, which is undergoing seri-
ous structural change, is next to
impossible. Since it embarked on an
economic liberalization program in
1978, China has been inching away from
a system of state-directed economic
activity, where prices and exchange rates
had virtually no role in resource alloca-
tion, to a more market-friendly model.
What might constitute an equilibrium
under one economic structure need not
hold under another. Consequently, the
continuing fundamental and structural
changes that China has undertaken must
make any calculation of an equilibrium
renminbi–dollar exchange rate highly
suspect. As the International Monetary
Fund recently noted, “…it is difficult to
arrive at any firm and robust conclusions
about the equilibrium level of the ren-
minbi using existing techniques.” Under-
scoring the point, recent estimates of the
renminbi’s undervaluation are rather
imprecise, ranging at least from 5 to 
40 percent. Five years ago, however,
many thought that the renminbi was
overvalued. 
Even if China undervalues the renminbi
with the intention of making products
and investment opportunities in the
country cheap, any trade advantage
would erode as prices adjusted; further-
more, the greater the undervaluation, the
faster any gain would dissipate. If China
undervalues the renminbi, the local price
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of its goods will tend to rise as Chinese
exports and investment opportunities
attract worldwide demand. Moreover, to
keep the renminbi stable relative to the
dollar in the face of an overall balance-
of-payments surplus, the People’s Bank
of China—the country’s central bank—
must buy dollars on the foreign-
exchange market. China has indeed
been doing so and, as a result, its official
holdings of international reserves have
risen dramatically (see figure 3). The
process, however, expands China’s
money stock and can eventually cause
inflation. This inflation-generating
mechanism should prevent China from
realizing a long-term trade advantage
from undervaluing the renminbi. 
Empirical estimates suggest that any
such advantage would disappear with a
half-life of approximately four years. 
This, however, has not happened, further
suggesting that the renminbi might not
have been so far out of line at 8.3 per
dollar. Between 1995 and 1997, China’s
inflation rate fell, and between 1997 and
2003, China experienced two mild defla-
tions. Overall, since 1997, China’s infla-
tion rate has almost always remained
within 4 percentage points of the U.S.
rate, and when the rates have diverged,
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, “International Financial Statis-
tics”; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the
National Bureau of Statistics of China.■ What’s Not Real?
Of course, the People’s Bank of
China might attempt to offset the
inflationary impact of its dollar gains,
and thereby the appreciation of the
real renminbi, by selling domestic
assets from its portfolio or by
increasing nonmonetary liabilities on
its balance sheet. Such actions, called
sterilization or sterilized intervention,
will jeopardize the exchange-rate peg
unless accompanied by restrictions
on imports and controls on financial
outflows. 
The People’s Bank generally did not
sterilize the monetary consequences
of its reserve purchases until rela-
tively recently. Between the second
quarter of 1995, when the peg began,
and the third quarter of 2004, China’s
central bank acquired the equivalent
of Rmb 4.6 trillion in foreign
exchange—believed to be mostly
dollars. This caused China’s mone-
tary base to expand 14 percent per
year. Most of this money growth,
however, has accommodated the
increase in the demand for money
that is associated with China’s rapid
economic growth. Chinese inflation
has actually moderated since 1995. 
Since mid-2002, however, the Peo-
ple’s Bank of China has sterilized
part—sometimes a substantial part—
of the increase in its foreign
exchange reserves, preventing them
from raising its monetary base (see
figure 4). In addition, the People’s
Bank has attempted to blunt the infla-
tionary consequences of its dollar
accumulation by increasing bank
reserve requirements, which reduces
the amount of bank loans that a given
change in the monetary base can 
support, and by directly attempting to
curb investment spending. 
Most economists contend, however,
that sterilized intervention will not
work. If—as has been the case—
maintaining a stable exchange rate
requires the People’s Bank to buy dol-
lars with renminbi, the exchange rate
cannot remain unchanged should the
Bank then reabsorb these renminbi
reserves through other operations.
Instead, the Chinese government must
promote stability by creating a persis-
tent demand for these renminbi at 
the existing exchange rate. China 
does this primarily through artificial
restraints on financial flows. In 
general, Chinese policies favor net
inflows of foreign direct investment,
encourage exports over imports, and—
most importantly— discourage other
types of private financial outflows,
largely by limiting the amount of dol-
lars that China’s residents might hold
and their ability to invest in foreign
assets. Remove the restraints and corre-
sponding policies, and the demand for
renminbi will fall relative to the supply,
and domestic prices will rise. The
adjustment will drive the real renminbi
exchange value and China’s balance of
payments to a new, market-determined
equilibrium.  
■ Conclusion
Arguing that China’s exchange-rate
policies undervalue the renminbi for a
strategic trade advantage is a hard sell
because, beyond the very short run,
nominal exchange rates do not seem to
matter much for trade. A more solid
argument might be that China’s net-
work of restraints on private financial
outflows and policies that promote net
exports interfere with the natural
adjustment of the real exchange rate.
As China’s restraints continue to
weaken, either out of compliance with
its World Trade Organization commit-
ments or the market’s proclivity to
scale such barriers, and as the country’s
international trade and investments
grow, tightly managing the nominal
exchange rate without increases in Chi-
nese prices—and a real appreciation—
will prove increasingly difficult. Steril-
izing reserve gains will become
useless. At that point, which may not
be far off, increased exchange-rate
flexibility will be necessary.
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China’s has tended to return close to 
the U.S. inflation rate (see figure 2).
Countries that keep their exchange rate
pegged or very stable typically experi-
ence such a general correspondence
between their inflation rates. 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, “International Financial
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